Can the Alliance for Survival Survive the TPLF’s Defeat? Jawar Mohammed
After the Alliance for Survival’s announcement, I argued that its ability to deliver on its stated objectives would be tested as soon as the TPLF launched an offensive. That test arrived quickly. The TPLF seized Mekelle airport and launched offensives on three fronts. The rapid reversal of those advances and the TPLF’s subsequent defeat have now dealt a potentially fatal blow to an alliance that was already struggling with internal contradictions.
The TPLF appears to have launched its offensive on two important assumptions. The first was that other Ethiopian rebel groups would simultaneously intensify their attacks in the areas where they operate, forcing the government to stretch its forces across several fronts and reducing the pressure on Tigray. Apart from limited attacks by Wollo Fano and Afar’s Ugugumo, however, rebel groups elsewhere in the country did little to alter the military balance.
The second assumption was that Eritrean forces would intervene quickly if the TPLF’s southward offensive encountered serious resistance. Eritrean forces eventually moved in, but by then the battlefield had already shifted beyond Wukro, and TPLF forces were increasingly in disarray. The Eritrean units that intervened also came under heavy attack before they could provide meaningful support, let alone halt or reverse the momentum of the ENDF and TPF advance.
Given the history of conflict among its members and the differences in their political objectives, trust was always going to be one of the Alliance for Survival’s weakest points. The failure of other rebel groups to open the additional fronts the TPLF appears to have expected has deepened those suspicions. The relationship with Eritrea is equally complicated. The TPLF can hardly afford to break with Isaias while it remains dependent on Eritrean support, but the timing and effectiveness of Eritrea’s intervention will inevitably raise questions inside the TPLF about how dependable that support really is. An alliance already short of trust has now accumulated even more reasons for its members to doubt one another.
The TPLF’s defeat has also weakened the alliance in a more practical way by disrupting Tigray’s role as an important corridor through which Eritrea and potentially Egypt could channel weapons and other logistical support to rebel groups farther south. With most of Tigray now under the control of federal and allied forces, that corridor has been severely disrupted.
For the Ethiopian rebel groups that joined the alliance, access to weapons, ammunition and logistical support was one of the strongest incentives for participating, making the disruption of this corridor particularly damaging. Joining the alliance also carried political costs, since cooperation with the TPLF and Eritrea remained unpopular among sections of their respective constituencies. The calculation appears to have been that the military and logistical benefits would compensate for those costs. If the disruption continues, much of that incentive disappears with it.
With trust badly eroded and the logistical route disrupted, the Alliance for Survival is hanging by a thread, and its future may now depend less on the relationship among its Ethiopian members than on the outcome of the confrontation between Isaias and Abiy.
If war breaks out between Ethiopia and Eritrea and Isaias succeeds in stopping an Ethiopian offensive, the alliance could recover. A prolonged war along the Eritrean frontier could tie down substantial Ethiopian forces, create new supply opportunities and give armed groups elsewhere another chance to coordinate their activities. Under those conditions, an alliance that currently appears badly weakened could acquire a new purpose.
If Abiy breaks through Eritrea’s defences, however, the calculation changes dramatically. The loss of Eritrean military protection and logistical support would leave the alliance’s Ethiopian members far more exposed. Some may distance themselves from the arrangement, while others could seek alternative political or military accommodations rather than risk confronting an emboldened federal government and a reinvigorated Ethiopian army.
This is why, from the beginning, I cautioned about the timing of the alliance’s announcement, the readiness of its members, and whether its political and military arrangements were strong enough to survive the first serious battlefield test. That test has now arrived, and the weaknesses I worried about are becoming visible. Whether the Alliance for Survival survives will depend far less on declarations of solidarity than on what happens next between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
