The Unbroken Spine: Why Arsi Remains the “Center of Gravity” of Oromo and Ethiopian History
The Core Argument: The Psychology of Resistance
The assertion that Arsi Oromo represents the “center of gravity” lies in the psychology of resistance. It is argued that a society uninfected by “slave morality”[Nietzsche’s concept of the internalization of inferiority and the demonization of power and freedom] will choose death over subjugation. The later was what preferred by Arsi.
Friedrich Nietzsche defined “slave morality” as a survival mechanism of the oppressed who revalue their weakness as a virtue to endure subjugation (Nietzsche, 1887, pp. 19-22).
The Arsi Oromo, however, rejected this inversion. As noted by historian Abbas H. Gnamo, the Arsi socio-political structure, rooted deeply in the Gadaa system, did not allow for the psychological acceptance of hierarchy imposed by an external entity. Their resistance was not merely a reaction to invasion but a proactive defense of an egalitarian worldview that viewed vassalage as a negation of their very humanity (Gnamo, 2014, pp. 138-140).
This refusal to accept a “colonial status” is why Dr. Gemechu Megersa, a prominent social anthropologist, identified Arsi as the “center of gravity” of Oromo politics during his speech on the funeral ceremony of Professor Hamdesa Tuso. In Oromo cosmology and political history, the preservation of the Gadaa structures in Arsi, long after they were weakened elsewhere, created a repository of indigenous knowledge and resistance (Megersa, 2011; Legesse, 1973/2000).
Historical Context: The Arsi Resistance (1880s)
To validate the claim that Arsi resistance forced the empire to resort to extreme brutality, one must examine the campaigns of Menelik II.
The resistance offered by the Arsi was distinct in its duration and intensity compared to other regions of the Horn of Africa.
The major subsequent resistances and their logical consequences is described as follows :
1. The Battle of Azule (1886)
The claim that Arsi resistance was a “total war” led by the Gadaa leadership is historically accurate. The Arsi mobilized a distinct military class under the Gadaa grades. At the Battle of Azule (September 6, 1886), the Arsi cavalry launched an offensive so overwhelming that Ras Darge (Menelik’s uncle and general) narrowly escaped destruction despite possessing superior firearms (Remington and Gras rifles) imported from Europe (Darkwah, 1975, p. 103; Gnamo, 2014, p. 159).
Historical records confirm that the Arsi fought “with spears and distinct military strategy.” Martial de Salviac, a French missionary writing in 1901, documented that the Oromo cavalry (specifically the Arsi) were “terrible” in their charge and that the Shoan forces only triumphed due to the overwhelming volume of rapid-fire weaponry, not tactical superiority (De Salviac, 1901/2005, p. 268).
2. Rejection of Vassalage
Historicaly it is depicted that Arsi leadership refused “vassalage” unlike other regions. Historical analysis confirms that while some Oromo elites in other provinces entered into gabbar (serf/vassal) relationships or political marriages to secure their status, the Arsi maintained a posture of total non-compliance.
This forced Menelik II to undergo six different military campaigns between 1881 and 1886 to subdue the region, a testament to the “spiritual death” the Arsi associated with surrender (Marcus, 1995, p. 80; Gnamo, 2014, p. 136).
3. The Atrocity of Aanolee
The tragedy of Aanolee is cited as the defining moment of psychological warfare. Historical evidence supports the assertion that because the Arsi could not be defeated by conventional means, the empire resorted to terrorism. Following the final defeat at Azule, Ras Darge ordered the mutilation of survivors at Aanolee to “break the psychological backbone” of the populace.
According to oral history recorded by researchers and confirmed by written accounts, the right hands of men and the right breasts of women were amputated. Abbas Gnamo notes that this was a calculated strategy: “The mutilation was not a random act of violence but a punishment for the Arsi’s refusal to surrender… it was meant to humiliate and terrorize the population into submission” (Gnamo, 2014, p. 173). The brutality was a direct response to the Arsi being “too proud” to accept the “slave morality” of the conquered.
Analysis of the Opposition: Revisionists and Opportunists
In this short article oppositions are categorized to the “Center of Gravity” thesis into “Historical Revisionists” and “Political Opportunists.”
#Revisionism: Academic discourse acknowledges that Ethiopian historiography was long dominated by “court historians” (chroniclers) who framed the conquest as a “holy unification” rather than a colonial expansion.
Scholars like Mohammed Hassen and Asafa Jalata argue that this “sanitized version” erases the agency of the Oromo as a sovereign nation defending its liberty (Hassen, 1990, p. 2; Jalata, 2005, p. 20).
Political Opportunism:
The fear of a unified Oromo sentiment is a recurring theme in Ethiopian political studies. Recognizing Arsi as the “spine” acknowledges that the Arsi[ Oromo] often served as the catalyst for broader Oromo nationalism, including the Bale Revolt of the 1960s, which effectively launched the modern Oromo liberation struggle (Tareke, 1991, p. 125).
Conclusion
The historical record supports Dr. Gemechu Megersa’s diagnosis. Arsi remains the Handhuuraa , meaning the “center of gravity” because it represents the longest, most kinetic defense of the Gadaa republic against imperial expansion. As Gnamo concludes, the Arsi resistance was “the most sustained and bloody in the history of the expansion of the Ethiopian empire,” proving that the preservation of dignity took precedence over life itself (Gnamo, 2014, p. 308).
